ABSTRACT The Internet of Vehicle (IoV) utilizes networks to conduct message exchange and related services or application. In recent years, smart cities and IoVs have become areas of interest in the new generation Internet of Things development, especially since the development of intelligent transportation system has focused on bettering traffic conditions. This paper proposes establishing an intelligent transportation system with a network security mechanism in an IoV environment, with emphasis on the following aspects: 1) this paper integrates intelligent transportation systems in traffic signal control to aid emergency vehicles in more promptly arriving at its destination; 2) in the case of traffic incidents, this paper's approach allows regular vehicles to obtain proof of incident from pertaining authorities and learn about nearby vehicles global positioning system information, such as position and speed, and utilize their car camcorder data for proving purposes; and 3) this paper combines roadside units (RSUs) with traffic signal control and transmits important information to the certificate authority (CA) for storage. Given that RSUs are limited in computation ability and storage space, we can assess and filter the information before sending it to the CA, reducing RSUs computational burden and storage space usage. This paper satisfies IoVs network security requirements of authentication, non-repudiation, conditional anonymity, and conditional untraceability, and, as seen from experiment results, the proposed method is superior to that of other studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Internet of Vehicles has been not only a technology promoted by many countries around the globe but also an area in which car companies invest in developing related products. The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) provides a wireless communication environment that allows vehicles to exchange traffic-related information [2] while enabling passengers to send emails or communicate with each other on their mobile device via in-vehicle wireless devices [3] . It has drawn particular interest in the fields of traffic safety and traffic management, especially since vehicles often utilize broadcast of traffic-related information (such as vehicle position, speed, traffic incidents) and other services to maintain traffic safety.
The IEEE Standard Association has also defined the network standard for IoVs. The IEEE-defined IoV system standard, IEEE 1609/WAVE, offers two modes of operation: (1) vehicle-to-vehicle communication (V2V) and (2) RSU-to-vehicle communication (R2V). In terms of wireless communication, it employs IEEE 802.11P for message delivery and must ensure Internet safety [4] in its IoV environment, of which safety requirements include authentication, non-repudiation, conditional anonymity, and conditional untraceability. In authentication, it must confirm the message and verify the claim of identity; in non-repudiation, it must be so that no physical equipment can deny the messages transmitted. In conditional anonymity, if a vehicle repeatedly changes its anonymous ID, then, aside from legally pertinent government agencies, no other vehicle can track the true ID of another vehicle. In case of a malicious message or vehicle, conditional untraceability allows for legally pertinent government agencies to track a vehicles true ID.
This study aims at establishing an intelligent transportation system with a network security mechanism. Since, under current conditions, emergency vehicles on dispatch rely on other vehicles to yield right of way but often get caught in traffic when faced with red lights or heavy traffic flow, this study combines roadside units (RSU) with traffic light control to allow for time regulation in emergency situations; additionally, in order to reduce storage burden of the certificate authority (CA) and RSU, the RSU only records vehicle IDs and GPS information of vehicles that undergo authentication. Furthermore, the RSU can calculate current traffic flow and issue a warning to CA in case the traffic is too heavy so that the traffic center can grasp the current traffic situation. When a vehicle is involved in a car crash or other incident, legal units can learn which vehicles drove by and obtain their dashboard camera. The RUS also records the emergency vehicles task-performance information; if a vehicles yielding leads to traffic violation, it can demand proof from the legal unit. All the above information must be protected by network security to avoid malicious tampering.
In terms of network security, this study uses bilinear pairing as the technology basis while combining the methods of chameleon hashing and ID-based cryptography to allow any unit to conduct message broadcast via chameleon hashing as well as perform message and identity verification. Meanwhile, employing the ID-based cryptography method enables any unit to conduct identity verification and private communication. In order to reduce computational complexity in each units private communication, this study uses ID-based cryptography to establish a common secret key for both parties, utilizing the common secret key for its symmetrickey encryption; since symmetric-key algorithms bear lower encryption/decryption computational complexity, computational burden of all units is reduced. The RSU can perform traffic flow analysis using the vehicles GPS information and, by making use of the emergency vehicles GPS and navigational system, control traffic light timing to enhance its rescue efficiency. This studys experimental analysis is superior to that of other research methods.
II. RELATED WORKS
Reference [5] mainly discuses how vehicles select the optimal node for forwarding messages. Vehicles locate nearby node positions via broadcast messages, calculate the distance and angles between itself and surrounding vehicles, and then choose the optimal node to deliver the message; meanwhile, in collaboration with other vehicles, they verify the authenticity of the node to avoid malicious activities. This study employs RSU for message broadcast so that vehicles only deliver messages to RSU, in turn preventing bandwidth wastage or broadcast radiation.
Reference [6] focuses on data access privacy protection in vehicles and RSUs. Reference [6] uses bilinear pairing for message encryption and authentication. However, given that bilinear pairing bears higher computational complexity, thus placing significant burden on vehicles message authentication, this study uses bilinear pairing for identity verification but applies symmetric-key algorithm for message communication in order to reduce encryption/decryption burden. References [7] - [10] also apply bilinear pairing for message authentication.
Reference [11] uses bilinear pairing for identity verification and hash message authentication code (HMAC) for messages. Although this reduces computational complexity in message authentication, all vehicles must maintain a form to record each vehicles hash message authentication code to verify a messages authenticity.
Reference [12] applies a chameleon hashing method based on bilinear pairing, similar to the concept proposed by this study. However, this studys chameleon hashing integrates the concept of ID-based cryptography, so that any user, knowing the other partys ID, can establish a common secret key for private communication.
Reference [13] mainly uses bilinear pairing for message authentication and is capable of accomplishing batch authentication to reduce authentication time. In this study, RSUs send messages to vehicles for self-authentication; the RSUs then broadcast message according to each messages level of emergency or traffic status, thus classified as real-time message authentication. This study will provide experiment comparison and analysis against [13] .
Reference [14] proposes using trusted authority to maintain each vehicles confidentiality and verification; it also proposes a dual authentication scheme that allows vehicles to conduct verification any time they join in. Meanwhile, it uses a different private key for each group to ensure a vehicles confidentiality.
Reference [15] discusses vehicles application of IEEE 802.11p multi-channel MAC under VANET. It has yielded satisfying experimental results; this study will also perform network packet testing to ensure network quality.
In [24] , cloud computing combined with Connected Car is used to provide different traffic services while fulfilling internet safety measures. Through cloud computing, statistical data can be put to broader use.
In [25] , lightweight certificateless and negotiations regarding session key reduction is used. The proposed method focuses on reducing web safety computing burden and countering the treat of known malware attacks.
III. BACKGROUND
This section will introduce the technologies used in the method developed in this study. Section III.A introduces System Model of the IoV, Section III.B discusses Bilinear Pairing, Section III.C discusses ID based Cryptography, and Section III.D covers Chameleon Hashing.
A. SYSTEM MODEL OF THE IoV
This studys proposed IoV system environment follows the illustration in Figure 1 . CA mainly refers to legal agencies, which are in charge of storing vehicle GPS information, adjusting traffic signal timing, and setting network security 
B. BILINEAR PAIRING
Suppose G 1 and G 2 are, respectively, additive and multiplicative groups that apply prime order q, and suppose P is G 1 s generator with a bilinear mapping ofê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , then the bilinear pairing has the following properties:
(
That is, the mapping does not send all pairs in G 1 × G 1 to the identity in G 2 .
(3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to computeê (P, P) for all P ∈ G 1 .
In this studys bilinear map, operation ofê follows the pairing methods of Weil [16] and Tate [17] , with data volume of G 1 and q being 161 bits and 160 bits respectively. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds that given (P, aP, bP) ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q , one can computê e (aP, bP) =ê (P, P) ab . The elliptic curve discrete logarithm postulates two elements P, Q ∈ G 1 and, assuming that a ∈ Z * q and Q = aP, value a is unobtainable even if P and Q are given.
C. ID BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
The upside to ID-based cryptography [18] is that it doesnt require a public key certificate. Suppose the private key generator (PKG) selects a random number a ∈ Z * q as the master key, in which the ID of users i and j are ID i and ID j , user IDs are public, and the private keys for ID i and ID j are respectively ID i · a · P and ID j · a · P. In such case, when ID i and ID j wish to establish a common secret key, user j s ID can be used to computeê ID j P, ID i · a · P =ê (P, P) ID j ·ID i ·a ; by contrast, user j can also compute the common secret key by referring toê ID i P, ID j · a · P =ê (P, P) ID i ·ID j ·a . If user i and user j reach the same common secret key, then they may conduct private communication; however, one cannot obtain a by only knowing the user ID and P, which ensures the security of private communication.
D. CHAMELEON HASHING
Reference [19] introduces chameleon hashings biggest advantage: it does not require a public key certificate. Moreover, as long as other users verify the chameleon hash value, the messages security is ensured. The users chameleon hash value is CH, in which CH = m * r; when a user wishes to deliver message m, they can compute x = CH − m * r and deliver the following parameter H g CH ||m||g x ||g r to other users. H() is a hash function; when other users receive the message and authenticates H g CH = H (g x + g m g r ) then a positive result indicates the message was unauthenticated while verifying its source.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
Section IV.A discusses system initialization; Section IV.B discusses vehicle and RSU identity verification and registration; Section IV.C focuses on broadcast message and authentication method while Section IV.D focuses on updating network security key. Section IV.E illustrates how, in case of emergency, CAs and RSUs control traffic signals. Section IV.F explains how RSUs assess traffic conditions via vehicle GPS information. Section IV.G explains how RSUs control traffic signals to avoid deadlock in case two emergency vehicles appear at an intersection.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
Given the bilinear parameters G 1 , G 2 , q,ê, P , CA establishes network security parameters as follows:
( 
(4) CA transmits parameters to the RSU:
The RSU advertises the parameters:
CA establishes emergency vehicles (EV) network security parameters as follows:
1) CA selects h ID t,EV i as EVs secret value. (2) CA computes EVs chameleon hashing value CH ID t,EV i satisfying CH ID t,EV i =ê α ID t,EV i · P, m ID t,EV i · β ID t,EV i · P = e h ID t,EV i · P, P , in which ID t,EV i is EVs true ID, α ID t,EV i = h ID t,EV i m ID t,EV i ×β ID t,EV i
, m ID t,EV i is EVs advertised message, and 
B. IDENTITY REGISTRATION AND PRIVATE COMMUNICATION
When vehicles come in range of RSUs, as shown in Figure 1 , V p,1 and R t,1 perform identity authentication registration. The authentication process is as follows:
In authentication step (1), V p,1 transmits parameters to Rt, 1 to perform identity authentication; in step (2), Rt, 1 utilizes the V p,1 s λ ID p,V 1 · P and β ID p,V 1 · P to establish a common secret key SK R t,1 ↔V p,1 between V p,1 and R t,1 to determine whether it is a legal user and whether the parameters fall within the period of validity (T ). In step (3), R t,1 transmits parameters to V p,1 and uses a common secret key to conduct symmetric encryption; if it is a legal user, then it may establish a common secret key to decipher messages and utilize hash function (H ) for message integrity authentication. In step (4), V p,1 utilizes R t,1 s λ ID t,R 1 · P and β ID t,R 1 · P to establish the common secret key SK V p,1 ↔R t,1 between V p,1 and R t,1 and determine whether the RSU is a legal user and whether the parameters fall within the period of validity (T ). In step (5), V p,1 uses the common secret key to transmit parameters to R t,1 while R t,1 , once deciphered, authenticates message integrity; R t,1 then stores V p,1 s ID and forwards it to CA, an authentication process in which no vehicle exposes its true identity. Meanwhile, IBC allows for verification of user legality and period of validity while applying the DiffieHellman assumption avoids man-in-the-middle attacks.
C. MESSAGE BROADCASTING
When an emergency vehicle (EV) is on a rescue mission, as shown in Figure 1 , EV t,1 will submit to identity verification through R t,1 and establish a common secret key to transmit emergency and rescue-related information to R t,1 under the authentication approach illustrated in IV.B. Following that, R t,1 will transmit relevant data to CA, R t,1 will utilize broadcast message to inform all vehicles in range to yield right of way. If and when a vehicle commits violation due to giving way, it may rely on legally pertinent government agencies to obtain information on the emergency vehicle and GPS data as proof of incident. The following concern broadcast messages and authentication:
(1) R t,1 :
In the above authentication step (1), R t,1 performs chameleon hashing on the emergency vehicle information, m ID t,R 1 . In step (2), R t,1 transmits parameters to all units (U ); in step (3), vehicles can voluntarily authenticate whether the message is from R t,1 , but they cannot obtain α ID t,R 1 and β ID t,R 1 from m ID t,R 1 , thus ensuring message integrity and security. Furthermore, only R t,1 can obtain CH ID t,R 1 , thus safeguarding the sourcing of messages.
D. UPDATING KEYS
In order to protect legal vehicles from malicious network attacks, parameters of vehicles and RSUs all bear a period of validity. When malicious vehicles are found to launch network attacks, CA stops renewing these malicious vehicles period of validity. Therefore, when any vehicle or RSU is authenticating an identity, if they find that the period of validity has expired, they will proceed to abandon the messages. The following illustrates how V p,1 update parameters and periods of validity:
According to the above illustration, V p,1 computes the common secret keys for R t,1 and CA; V p,1 utilizes its common secret key with R t,1 to perform symmetric encryption on parameters it transmits to CA. R t,1 will then decipher it and transmit the cyphertext from V p,1 s encryption to CA, a process in which no other vehicle can conduct decryption on; meanwhile, R t,1 has no way of obtaining the cyphertext V p,1 transmits to CA. Following the above, CA conducts decryption using the common secret key, establishing V p,1 s network parameters as follows:
( 1) 
E. TRAFFIC SIGNAL CONTROL
When emergency vehicles are on dispatch, they send out information to RSUs, including current GPS data, destination GPS data, and rescue purpose (such as first-aid service, fire control, or rescue). As shown in Figure 1 , EV t,1 sends out mission information to R t,1 and transmits it to CA; CA then utilizes a navigation system to calculate the shortest route possible as well as the RSUs on the route, and transmits the navigation system results to the emergency vehicle EV t,1 . The procedure is as follows: (1 
In the above procedure, CA uses a navigation system to calculate the emergency vehicles shortest route, nav m ID t,EV 1 , and all the on-the-route RSUs, Search nav m ID t,EV 1 . CA informs about emergency vehicles that will pass by these RSUs so that RSUs can integrate traffic signals. Emergency vehicles then come into RSUs way, and RSUs must switch traffic signals or hold them for a longer period of time in order to create a traffic flow, as shown in Figure 1 when EV t,1 enters R t,1 . The following is an illustration of the traffic signal control procedure:
If EV t,1 arrival R t,1 //emergency vehicles reach the RSU If TS R t,1 = green light //if a traffic light turns green If green light sec < 60 sec //green lights must last for at least 60 secs green light sec increase 60 sec End Else traffic signals != green light //if the traffic light is not green Switch the traffic lights status End End R t,1 also sends out messages to inform the next two RSUs to prepare for traffic signal switch. Since RSUs employ the 802.11P wireless communication standard, which has a transmission range of 1000 meters at most, suppose an emergency vehicle moves at 70km/h on the road, then the times it takes to travel 1000 meters is: 1Km 70Km/h = 51Sec Since emergency VOLUME 5, 2017 vehicles must leave within 51 seconds, this study sets the interval at 60 seconds.
F. ASSESSING TRAFFIC CONDITIONS
RSUs integrate traffic signals and control those signals through RSUs; therefore, RSUs are aware of each traffic signals switching time and cycle. This study assumes three situations in traffic signals: green light, red light, and yellow light. RSUs only need to assess car speed (Sp) and density (Den) in the case of green lights. Generally, three factors play into assessing whether there has been any incident on a road: (1) car speed, (2) density, and (3) traffic flow (flow). The formula is: flow = Sp * Den. Given that all vehicles voluntarily register with RSUs and transmit GPS data to RSUs every second, it is possible to access each vehicles GPS data. The GPS data includes a vehicles latitude and longitude, speed, and driving direction; since we can calculate each vehicles average speed E Sp V p,U and given that RSUs have communication range of 1000 meters as well as knowledge of current number of vehicles in its range, we can calculate the overall traffic flow. When the traffic flow exceeds a certain threshold, it suggests that traffic is congested; the assessment process is as follows:
If TS R t,1 = green light //if the traffic light is green If flow >= Threshold Issue a warning message End End The RSU issues a warning message to the CA, informing it of current road conditions; vehicles can turn to legally pertinent agencies to obtain road conditions of a certain time for proof.
G. DEADLOCK
RSUs might receive two pieces of emergency rescue information at the same time. As illustrated in Figure 1 , EV t,1 and EV t,2 both issued emergency rescue request. The RSU at the intersection maintains the same schedule to change traffic signal timing. Generally, traffic signals on opposite directions should display the same signal; however, in Figure 1 , TS 1 and TS 2 display the same signal, TS 3 and TS 4 display the same signal, thus, when we change R t,1 s signal timing, we must also change the timing of TS 1 , TS 2 , TS 3 , and TS 4 . This study applies a queuing method; when emergency message is received, it is handled in a first-infirst-out manner. As illustrated in Figure 2 , when R t,1 , R t,2 , R t,3 , and R t,4 receive messages from the emergency vehicle, the RSU places the message in its queue. Each intersection is controlled by one RSU to change traffic signals; as shown in Figure 1 , R t,1 , is responsible for adjusting traffic signal timing, and the adjustment is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . This studys network security analysis focuses on the following four requirements: authentication, non-repudiation, conditional anonymity, and conditional untraceability. The study employs chameleon hashing in message broadcasting and identity verification while utilizing the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP); although other vehicles may have access to V p,1 s public parameters, This study allows for any two parties to engage in private communication. As long as a vehicle obtains the other partys anonymous ID and its own β ID p,V i · P and λ ID p,V i · P, it can compute a common secret key; the u and k of β ID p,V i · P and λ ID p,V i ·P are only known to CA, so other vehicles cannot carry out anonymous ID fabrication, ensuring that the common secret key can only be established by the two pertaining parties.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our proposed method against that of [11] , [12] , [14] , and [23] . The table illustrates difference of method between this study and [11] , [12] , [14] , and [23] . Table 1 shows the many advantages our method possesses. In Table 2 , we propose encryption/decryption computation time based on encryption/decryption execution time of [20] - [22] . As shown in Table 1 , this studys method does not require certificates, hence reducing CAs burden in certificate management; moreover, by relieving RSUs from authenticating vehicle information, we reduce RSUs computation burden. Given that one-way hash chains or timed efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication need to generate a set of keys, vehicles require extra storage space to store these keys.
As seen in Table 3 , when it comes to vehicle and RSU identity registration in this studys method, only the firsttime establishment of common secret keys requires a longer time; in the following steps, symmetric-key encryption takes 0.19ms, decryption takes 4.65ms, message broadcast only require a longer time in their first-time establishment of a common secret key; following that, private communication signing only takes 0.19 ms, decryption takes 4.65 ms; our proposed private communication approach is more favorable than [14] . As for updating keys, since in our method, the CA and RSU have already established a common secret key, they can update the vehicles key simply through private communication. Although this studys method presents higher computational complexity in RSU identity registration, it exceeds other approaches in message broadcast, private communication, and key updates.
This study utilizes the EstiNet simulator to simulate communication methods. EstiNet has a vehicle communication simulation function, as shown in Figure 5 . This study applies 802.11P for network communication protocol, and conducts V2I and V2V simulation. From the simulations, we can learn about the packet switching situation between vehicles and RSUs and, from such simulation approaches, we have confirmed that this studys communication method is feasible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed method in this study emphasizes utilizing RSUs to assess traffic flow and assist emergency vehicles. If RSUs can control traffic signals in case of traffic congestion, it can improve emergency vehicles rescue efficiency. Vehicles can encounter any kind of incident on the road, such as car accidents; in such cases, vehicles can obtain GPS information from legal agencies to serve as proof of incident; by contrast, legal agencies can obtain visual proof of major accidents from other vehicles. The aforementioned methods must rely on the protection of network security to ensure information authentication. This studys method satisfies requirements in authentication, non-repudiation, conditional anonymity, and conditional untraceability; moreover, experiment results show that such method is superior to other ones. This research will continue to follow this method and investigate how to satisfy the aforementioned requirements without relying on RSUs. 
